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Phenomenology as Radical Reflection
Dave Ward
1. Introduction
‘What is phenomenology?’, asks Merleau-Ponty in the opening sentence of his
Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012 (henceforth PhP), lxx).
The next sentences list a series of apparently antinomial characterizations of
phenomenology: as the study of ‘essences’ versus the study of facts; as a transcen-
dental philosophy versus a philosophy based on our empirical contact with the
world; as an ‘exact science’ versus an account of the world as we live and
experience it; as an attempt to provide a theoretically unmediated characterization
of experience versus an attempt to investigate the ‘genetic’ processes via which
experience is ‘constructed’ (PhP lxx). Why begin a characterization of phenom-
enology in this way? Merleau-Ponty’s intention, I will suggest, is neither to show
that phenomenology is a hopeless, self-contradictory endeavor, nor to pick
between these apparently opposing aspects of phenomenology. Instead, he aims
to show that phenomenology, as he pursues it, is defined by the task of under-
standing our perceptual and cognitive contact with the world in a way that faces
up to and attempts to transcend these apparent contradictions. It is defined by this
task because, as we shall see, phenomenological philosophy as Merleau-Ponty
understands it emerges dialectically from tensions within attempts to understand
our perceptual and cognitive contact with the world in ways that emphasize only
one side of the antinomies above. This chapter traces that dialectic, with a view to
illuminating the distinctive Merleau-Pontian methodology for philosophy of
perception that results.
As with any good dialectic, the story unfolds by examining a particular way of
understanding some domain (here, perceptual experience and its relation to the
world), showing that it falls prey to internal tensions or contradictions, then using
these tensions to motivate an alternative understanding. For example (in an
instance of this dialectic that will be familiar to readers of PhP), Merleau-Ponty
argues that ‘empiricist’ accounts of perception as a straightforward record of the
impacts of the world on our sensory periphery fail, in a way that motivates
‘intellectualist’ accounts that emphasize the perceiver’s active role in structuring
their experience of the world. The dialectical twist in the tale is that the contradic-
tions of the first accounts are only apparently resolved by the second—intellectualist
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accounts succumb to their own internal contradictions, motivating a new kind of
account that aims to develop the best bits of empiricist and intellectualist
approaches while avoiding their problems. As we will see, an instance of this
empiricist/intellectualist dialectic plays out in Merleau-Ponty’s methodological
reflections in PhP and throughout his career. The upshot, I argue here, is that
Merleau-Ponty understands phenomenology of perception as committed to
engaging in radical reflection—a kind of reflection on the structure of perceptual
experience that simultaneously ‘attempts to understand itself ’ (PhP 251/288) by
understanding its own origins and limitations. Seeing what this means in practice
involves understanding how Merleau-Ponty is led to this view via the failures of
alternative ways of pursuing phenomenological philosophy. The plan for the next
sections is thus to outline various ways of conducting phenomenological philoso-
phy, which I shall label ‘Humean’, ‘Kantian’, and ‘Husserlian’ (§2), and show how
the explanatory credentials of each are rendered problematic (§3, §4) in ways that
‘Merleau-Pontian’ phenomenology aims to resolve (§5). As well as affording a
clearer vision of the shape of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and its motivations, the
pay-off of the account I present here is the promise of a richly interdisciplinary way
of doing philosophy of perception, according to which it is necessarily integrated
with many other branches of philosophy and the sciences.
2. Humean, Kantian, and Husserlian Phenomenology
of Perception
This section works through three competing ways of pursuing phenomenological
philosophy of perception. But what does it mean to adopt a ‘phenomenological’
methodology when attempting to understand perception? To give us something to
work with, let’s start with the following broad construal:
Phenomenology of perception is the attempt to draw philosophical conclusions
about the structure of perception from careful reflection on experience.
Talk of the structure of perception should be interpreted broadly, as encompassing
any invariant feature of perceptual experiences—for example, the kinds of con-
tent, phenomenal character, temporal structure, or relationship to the world, that
are found in perceptual experiences, or some well-defined subset of perceptual
experiences.¹
¹ In what follows, we will see that this definition of phenomenology needs to be deepened and
complicated if phenomenology is to be a viable strategy for doing philosophy of perception. But
I nonetheless adopt it for now—seeing the problems it engenders will prove useful for understanding
the motivations of Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology.
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On this broad construal, the history of philosophy is filled with phenomenol-
ogists. Consider, for example, some views on perception and causation that might
be extracted from Hume and Kant. How, if at all, do causal relations between
events figure in our perceptual experience? Hume’s sceptical views about caus-
ation (as well as induction, the self, and more) are grounded in his reflections on
the relations between different elements of our experience. Hume distinguishes
between impressions—sensory experiences, including internal sensations of desir-
ing, willing, and feeling—and ideas, experiences resulting from abstracting from,
or reflecting on, impressions. This distinction, Hume thinks, is itself phenomeno-
logically obvious—‘as evident as that betwixt feeling and thinking’ (Hume 1740/
1978, p.647). He goes on to argue that our perceptual awareness of causal relations
between events is an idea, rather than an impression of causation. In any given
instance where we experience a causal connection between events, we can discern
only an impression associated with the perceived cause, an impression associated
with the perceived effect, and an idea corresponding to the perceived causal
relation between the two. For our purposes here, the most important feature of
this argument is that Hume can be understood as simply reading off these
conclusions from disciplined reflection on the structure of experience. This
reflection first reveals the distinction between Hume’s two basic ingredients of
experience, then shows how these ingredients are structured in experiences of
causal relations. Read in this way, Hume is an example of what we might call an
empirical phenomenologist. Empirical phenomenologists hold that there are
empirical facts of the matter about the structure of experience which serve as
key premises in philosophical arguments, and that all an aspiring phenomenolo-
gist need do to uncover these facts is attend carefully. In what follows, I’ll refer to
phenomenologists of this kind as ‘Humean’.²
According to the orthodox reading of Hume, the above view of the structure of
causal experience reveals that our irresistible compulsion to experience certain
contiguous events in terms of causal relations reflects a mere quirk of human
psychology, rather than any insight into the metaphysical structure of events.
Famously, Kant claimed that these sceptical conclusions awoke him from the
‘dogmatic slumbers’ of rationalist metaphysics. Kant agrees with Hume that the
structure of our empirical experience cannot ground the claims to legitimacy of
our compulsive application of causal concepts to the world. But he nonetheless
argues that this application is justified. His strategy is transcendental—here and
elsewhere, he proceeds by attempting to specify structures that perceptual experi-
ence and judgement must have in order for it to be intelligible that our experience
² The arguments and methodologies I label as ‘Humean’ and ‘Kantian’ are not intended as high-
fidelity reconstructions of the positions of Hume and Kant themselves. This way of labelling positions is
partly inspired by Husserl’s (1954/1975) own historical origin story for phenomenology, as well as the
rhetorical use Merleau-Ponty makes of Hume and Kant.
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or thought instantiates a property that it manifestly possesses. We can illustrate
this via considering his response to Hume, which aims to show that applying
causal concepts to suitably contiguous events is no mere quirk of human psych-
ology, but required as a matter of rational necessity. Perhaps the simplest version
of an anti-Humean argument can be extracted from the second ‘Analogy of
Experience’ in the Critique of Pure Reason. There Kant argues that the very
experience of something happening in the perceiver’s world presupposes the
application of causal concepts:
I render my subjective synthesis of apprehension objective only by reference to a
rule in accordance with which the appearances in their succession, that is, as they
happen, are determined by the preceding state. The experience of an event [i.e. of
anything as happening] is itself possible only on this assumption.
(Kant 1787/1997, A195/B240)
Why? Kant’s reasoning appears to be as follows. Consider two ways in which you
might experientially undergo a successive stream of appearances—first, as a
Jamesian ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ in which it seems that the appearances
composing your ongoing experience are arbitrary, chaotic, and unstructured;
second, as an experience of a perceptible event unfolding in the perceiver-
independent world. Kant’s argument relies on the insight that the first type of
experience need not present itself to you as disclosing any events that are external
to your subjectivity—such a sequence of appearances could be experienced merely
as a series of arbitrary and unstructured modifications of that subjectivity. To have
an experience of an unfolding external event, you must understand the appear-
ances composing your experience as connected—you must take there to be some
rhyme or reason as to why this appearance is succeeded by that one. Kant argues
that taking one’s subjective appearances to be connected in this way (i.e. to
experience things in terms of ‘a rule in accordance with which the appearances
in their succession . . . are determined by the preceding state’ (Kant 1787/1997))
simply is to experience them in terms of their causal connections—that is, in terms
of the way in which one appearance necessarily follows from its predecessors.
Thus, Kant has argued, having experiences as of external unfolding events pre-
supposes that our experiences are structured by an understanding of how current
appearances are determined by past ones; and this simply amounts to under-
standing the relations between succeeding appearances causally.
The argument just sketched counts as a piece of transcendental phenomenology.
It is a phenomenological argument (at least on the broad construal we are currently
working with) because it reaches its conclusion by starting from a manifest fact
about experience—that we have experiences as of things happening. Empirical (or
Humean) phenomenology purports to read off structural properties of experience,
such as the way in which causation figures in our perception of the world, from the
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experiences themselves. Transcendental phenomenology, by contrast, reflects on
the conditions of possibility that must be fulfilled in order for experience to manifest
itself to us in the way it does, attempting to identify the structural properties of
experience that are required for it to possess its manifest properties. Hume argues
that empirical reflection on perceptual experience reveals that causation is nothing
but an idea that we compulsively associate with appropriately-structured impres-
sions; Kant responds by arguing that transcendental reflection reveals that our
experience couldn’t intelligibly possess a property that it manifestly does possess
(the property of seeming to disclose the occurrence of perceiver-independent
events) without its constituent appearances being structured for the subject in
terms of their causal interrelations. Thus, contra Hume, our compulsive applica-
tion of the concept of causality in experience is not a rationally arbitrary psycho-
logical habit or custom, but a necessary precondition on the possibility of having
a mind that could be in touch with unfolding external events. If the Kantian
argument is sound, then, the causal structure of perceptual experience cannot be
rationally arbitrary, since it is a prerequisite for the capacity to experience or
cognize events at all.
So far I have been using a permissive definition of ‘phenomenological’ philoso-
phy that allows me to encompass these Humean and Kantian arguments (for
some authoritative support for this appropriation, see Husserl: CES 87–100;
Merleau-Ponty: PhP 226–9). Suppose we instead adopted the more restrictive
(and more common) construal of phenomenology as picking out a philosophical
movement inaugurated by Husserl, running through Heidegger, Sartre, de
Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty and others, and continuing to the present day. Are
there any Humeans among the members of that movement? Whilst phenomen-
ologists are sometimes criticized in terms that depict them as simply ‘reading off ’
philosophical conclusions from the inspection of experience (see e.g. Dennett
1991; Metzinger 2003; Bayne 2004), I know of no major phenomenologists who
explicitly avow the use of this kind of methodology. The best someone searching
for such an avowal can do is, I think, to wrest phrases or passages out of important
context—for example, by citing Merleau-Ponty’s claim that ‘[Phenomenology] is
the attempt to provide a direct description of our experience such as it is . . . ’ (PhP
lxx). We’ll return to the context in which Merleau-Ponty makes this statement
below, where we’ll see how and why it allows us to understand his distinctive
approach to phenomenological methodology.
This lack of bona fide Humean phenomenologists can be traced to the fact that
Husserl, in the phenomenological movement’s inaugural works, defines phenom-
enology in transcendental terms, as an attempt to uncover the essential a priori
structures governing thought and experience. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl
defines the subject matter of phenomenology as ‘experiences intuitively seizable
and generalizable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empir-
ically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human or animal
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experients’ (LI 86), and goes on to say that each statement of such an essential
property of experience is ‘an a priori statement in the highest sense of the word’
(LI 86). In the subsequent Ideas, he complains about those who have misinter-
preted his phenomenology as a ‘sub-domain of empirical psychology’ (I 2), and
contrasts ‘phenomenology’ that merely elucidates empirical facts about experience
with ‘pure or transcendental phenomenology . . .which aims exclusively at estab-
lishing “knowledge of essences” (Wesenserkenntnisse) and absolutely no “facts” ’
(I 3, original emphasis). Husserl makes this contrast between ‘essence’ and ‘fact’
here because he sees himself as engaged in a Kantian transcendental project
(LI 14) which aims to show how the very intelligibility of there being facts of the
kind that Humeans aim to catalogue rests on the essential structural properties
that the transcendental Phenomenologist aims to uncover. It is because he thinks
that the essences revealed by the Phenomenologist are the transcendental basis
of the possibility of empirical facts that he thinks of statements of essence as a
priori ‘in the highest sense of the word’ (LI 14). One way in which we can contrast
the Humean with the Kantian and Husserlian approaches to phenomenology is by
comparing their respective strategies for identifying the essences, or essential
properties, of kinds of perceptual experience. Broadly construed, something’s
essence is that which makes it what it is; its essential properties are those necessary
for its being the kind of thing it is. Insofar as we can understand the Humean as
attempting to uncover essential properties at all, these are mere empirical
regularities—such as the exceptionless regularity that experiences of causation
are always occasioned by a concatenation of impressions with a particular struc-
ture. For the Kantian, an experience’s essential properties are those that are
transcendentally (rather than merely empirically) necessary—causal structure,
for example, is an essential property of experiences that seem to disclose events.
However, Husserl (at least by the time of Ideas) recommends a route from an
experience’s manifest properties to its essential properties that looks slightly
different from Kant’s. Whilst Kant aimed to identify experience’s a priori struc-
tures via constructing arguments about the conditions under which experience
could possess its manifest properties, Husserl’s phenomenology aims at intuiting
essences—that is, gaining direct, self-evident experience of fundamental structural
properties of experience—via the activity of eidetic variation. In eidetic variation
we home in on the eidos (essence) of a type or property of experience through
imaginatively varying aspects of the experience, and seeing what must remain
invariant if the type or property of experience is to be preserved (I 14, 134–7).
Consider a perceptual experience of a dog. What could you imaginatively remove
from the way in which the experience presents its object to you whilst preserving
its dog-presenting character? Tail-wagging? Fur? Three-dimensionality? Whatever
you couldn’t consistently imagine subtracting from the experience whilst leaving its
dog-presenting character intact is part of the eidos of your perceptual experiences
of dogs. We might see Kant’s transcendental arguments as a sophisticated instance
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of this kind of eidetic variation. The Kantian argument sketched above invited us to
consider whether an experience as of external unfolding events could survive the
subtraction of the experiencer’s grasp of the way in which successive appearances
were determined by their predecessors. The suggested conclusion was that it
couldn’t, thereby showing that causal structure is an essential property of experi-
ences of external happenings. Despite this commonality, Husserl and Kant diverge
importantly. Whereas the ultimate aim of Husserl’s analyses are intuitions of
experience’s essential properties, Kant aimed instead at a discursive understanding
of those properties. The contrast between these options will become clearer in the
next section, when we examine how Husserlian phenomenology is motivated by a
dissatisfaction with the Kantian approach.
In addition to Humean phenomenology, which aims to read perception’s
structural properties off the surface of experience, we now have two kinds of
transcendental phenomenology: Kantian phenomenology which aims at discur-
sive understanding of the necessary preconditions for manifest features of our
experience, andHusserlian phenomenology which aims at an intuitive grasp of the
essential properties of experience, achieved via eidetic variation. This latter con-
ception of phenomenology, however, is transformed by the end of Husserl’s career
(though I’ll continue to refer to it simply as ‘Husserlian’ in what follows), and the
transformation is inherited and continued by Merleau-Ponty. We can start to
understand this transformation and its motivations by considering a pressing
question that phenomenologists face—from where do the standards that guide
phenomenological reflection derive their authority?
3. Problems with Authority
So far, I’ve said nothing to support my initial claims that there is a dialectical
relationship between the Humean, Kantian, and Husserlian approaches sketched
above, and that this relationship is important for Merleau-Ponty’s methodology.
In this section I suggest that we can see how Humean, Kantian, and Husserlian
phenomenology stand in a dialectical relationship by considering how each of
them attempts to ground the authority of their own phenomenological claims. As
we will see, the Husserlian approach is motivated by problems with the sources of
authority appealed to by the Humean and Kantian strategies. This will put us in a
position to see, in the subsequent sections, how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
is motivated by similar problems for the Husserlian approach.
The Humean, Kantian, and Husserlian as presented above each have a different
strategy for characterizing the structural properties of perceptual experience.
Which strategy should we prefer? One way of attempting to answer this question
is to consider the authority on which the characterizations of each strategy are
supposed to rest. Consider first how this issue of authority arises for the Humean.
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As we saw above, Hume took his view of the way in which causality figures in
our experience to motivate the sceptical conclusion that our experience gives us
no insight into the metaphysical structure of reality with respect to causal
relations. Once we see that our compulsive association of causal ideas with
suitably structured impressions is a rationally arbitrary psychological custom,
we have no reason to think that this custom reflects anything but a quirk of our
own psychological structure. There were several parts to this Humean argument: an
initial claim that the elements of experience can be partitioned into impressions
and ideas; the claim that our experiences never involve an impression of
causation, only conjunctions of impressions that reliably give rise to the idea
of causation; and the concluding claim that this shows that we have no reason to
think that our experiences of causation track some experience-independent
structural feature of reality. Why should we accept these claims? As I’ve depicted
Humean phenomenology above, it invites us to simply ‘read off ’ the structure of
perception from our experiences—and Hume invites his readers to consider
their own experiences in support of his split between impressions and ideas, and
his claim that experiences of causation consist in ideas occasioned by impres-
sions. So part of the authority of the Humean phenomenology of causation is
supposed to derive directly from its match with experience itself. But note that
the Humean claims above concern more than just the manifest properties of
particular experiences—they include claims about a general distinction between
impressions and ideas that is supposed to apply to all experiences, about the
structure of all experiences of causation, and about what this shows about the
relationship between experiences of causation and the world. These are conclu-
sions that can’t simply be ‘read off ’ from individual experiences, since they
aspire to a generality that goes beyond any individual experience we might
examine. Instead, Hume arrives at these more general conclusions by reasoning
and extrapolating from the specific experiences he appeals to. The problems for
the Humean arise when we ask after the authority of these extrapolations and
episodes of reasoning. As Husserl points out,
Hume did not ask the question, or at least did not say a word, about the status of
the reason—Hume’s—which established this theory as truth, which carried out
these analyses of the soul and demonstrated these laws of association. . . . Even if
we knew about them, would not that knowledge itself be another datum on the
tablet? (CES 88)
That is, the Humean’s demonstration of the lack of a rational relation between our
ideas and the concatenations of impressions with which they are associated
appears to undermine its own authority. If the moves in Hume’s argument strike
us as compelling or unavoidable, the worry arises that they do so only in virtue of
other rationally arbitrary psychological habits. We have no reason to think that
OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 29/1/2021, SPi
    241
Comp. by: ANEESKUMAR A Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0005062135 Date:29/1/21
Time:16:19:37 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0005062135.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 242
the episodes of reasoning involved in Hume’s argument are any more than a series
of ideas occasioned by the impressions on which the Humean was reflecting—that
is, we have no more reason to think that they disclose a fundamental structural
feature of perception than we have to think our experiences of causation disclose a
structural feature of reality. By limiting their methodology to reading psycho-
logical structure off the surface of experience, Humeans thus appear to deprive
their read-outs of any plausible source of authority. When faced with the question
of why their descriptions should compel assent, or why they represent an import-
ant epistemic gain, the only resources available for an answer will be more
rationally arbitrary psychological facts—more ‘data on the tablet’. Humeans
might invite us to reflect further on our experiences of billiard-ball collisions, or
to gather more such experiences; or they might appeal to how rationally compel-
ling the moves in their argument seem. But no particular experience of causation,
or of rational compulsion, can mandate the general claims about the structure of
perception that Humeans seek to establish. This is not yet to say that the Humean
claims should be rejected—only that, in considering how those claims can be
supported, we must look beyond the surface properties of experience to which
Humeans appeal. Thinking through the credentials of Humean phenomenological
claims thus motivates us to consider what sources of authority there might be,
other than appeal to the surface properties of experience, for general claims about
the structure of perception.
Does the Kantian approach fare better? From where do its phenomenological
claims draw their authority? We saw above that the Kantian’s transcendental
claims are supposed to have a straightforwardly rational grounding—Kantians
start with uncontroversially manifest features of experience (such as the facts that
perceptual experience seems to present us with a mind-independent world, or
takes place from a perspective, or can involve experiences as of things happening)
and attempt to provide a priori arguments about the necessary conditions for
experience’s possession of those features. They traffic in a priori claims about
which structural properties of perception are necessarily required for it to be
intelligible that experience possesses a given manifest property. The focus on
rational necessity and a priori entailment means that the Kantian’s claims should
automatically have the generality and universality that eluded the Humean.
However, the Kantian’s appeal to rational authority faces a different challenge:
why should the rational authority that is grounded in the cogency of the Kantian’s
theoretical arguments and reconstructions have any jurisdiction within the
domain of untheorized, lived experience that is the subject matter of phenomen-
ology? Before we start to philosophize, after all, experience isn’t presented to us in
Kantian terms of syntheses, apperceptions, and mutually interdependent faculties
of cognition. If it were, the Critique of Pure Reason would read like a long-winded
reminder of facts that were already perfectly familiar to us. Instead, these terms are
theoretical constructions via which Kantians attempt to make the structure of
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experience intelligible to reflection. There is, of course, nothing intrinsically wrong
with this—theorizing a domain inevitably involves imposing some general frame-
work upon it that confers intelligibility in part by abstracting away from fine-
grained details and particularities. But we can always ask of a given theory whether
it abstracts away from the right particularities—whether it ignores or glosses over
important facts about the theorized domain that it cannot readily accommodate.
In this case, Kantians attempt to understand the structure of perceptual experi-
ence by providing transcendental arguments about the structures such experience
must have—as a matter of rational necessity—if it is to possess its manifest
properties. In response, we may wonder whether this methodology abstracts
away from important structural features of experience. Perhaps there is a gap
between aspects of the immediate, untheorized experience from which Kantian
phenomenology begins, and the theoretical reconstruction of the abstract struc-
tures of experience at which it aims. There may be important structural aspects of
our experience which are simply unamenable to the Kantian’s reflective analysis,
in that their contribution to our experience cannot be revealed via a rationally
compelling transcendental argument.
The problem I am raising here is not that there demonstrably are such aspects
of experience which resist the Kantian’s rational reconstructions—merely coun-
tenancing the possibility that there might be poses a serious problem for their
methodology. To see why, consider how a Kantian might respond to this possi-
bility. The simple strategy of taking an introspective inventory of one’s experience
to check for the presence of such rationally unanalysable structural features is
unavailable to them, since their methodology is defined by the reflective attempt
to abstract away from the surface features of experience to the a priori structures
that are their transcendental requirements. Because Kantian phenomenology is
motivated by the attempt to provide a more compelling source of authority for
phenomenological claims than the Humean appeal to the surface properties of
experience, it cannot now fall back on an appeal to its fit with those properties to
ground the authority of its transcendental claims. An alternative response on
behalf of the Kantian would be to claim that their a priori reflections must be
accurately revealing the structural properties of experience—for how could it
intelligibly be otherwise? Their transcendental arguments, after all, show that
perceptual experience could not intelligibly possess some universally agreed-
upon manifest property without having these structural features. But in this
context, such a response is clearly question-begging—the ‘must’ above is the
‘must’ of rational necessity. But the possibility we are countenancing is that
the Kantian’s project of telling us, via armchair rational reconstructions, about
the structure that experience (rationally)must have might obscure important facts
about the structure that it does have. Husserl (CES 97, 115) and Merleau-Ponty
(PhP 228/265, PrP 18–19) both suggest that Kant fails to break completely from
his dogmatic rationalist roots by neglecting to properly consider this question of
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the authority of his rational reconstructions over the domain of untheorized
experience.
We have been asking about the source of the authority of phenomenological
analyses—why should we think that these analyses accurately reflect the reality
they aim to capture, or that they represent an epistemic gain? In answering this
question, we have seen that Humeans can appeal only to empirical experience,
Kantians only to rational intelligibility. But the scepticism that flows from
Humean phenomenology makes the first answer unconvincing, and in the context
of Kantian phenomenology the second answer is question-begging—Kantians
lack the materials to build a bridge between the character of lived experience
and their theoretical descriptions. We can see a dialectical relationship between
the Humean and Kantian positions and their respective shortcomings. The prob-
lem for the Humean was that appeal to the surface properties of particular
experiences cannot ground their general claims about the structural properties
of experience. We can see the Kantian position as a natural reaction to this
problem. Because it relies on a priori theorizing about the necessary preconditions
of experience, the a priori structures it identifies should be generally valid—they
should apply to all experiences that we can make intelligible sense of. But we asked
above why the fact that these structures should apply entitles us to conclude that
they do apply to the particular experiences we in fact have. Surely the right test for
whether they do apply is simply to look and see? But to endorse this test would, it
seems, be to fall back on the Humean position from which the Kantian was
attempting to escape.
The Husserlian approach described above can be seen as attempting to resolve
this dialectic by synthesizing the Humean and Kantian approaches—building on
each of them in a way that keeps the good bits and throws away the bad.³
Husserlians assure us that we can trust their claims about the essential structures
of our experience because those essences are intuited—grasped directly and self-
evidently. Like the Humean, the Husserlian grounds the authority of their analyses
in the experience on which they are reflecting—when discovering a Husserlian
essence we intuit, rather than discursively understand, a property that our experi-
ence really has. But Husserlians can say more than Humeans about why we should
take the psychological properties we intuit as revealing important structural
truths, since we intuit them as features of experience that are reflectively necessary
³ I’m not arguing here that the development of Husserl’s philosophy is explicitly motivated by the
failings of Humean and Kantian approaches—only that this way of labelling and understanding the
tensions at work in Husserl’s early phenomenology (that is, up to and including Ideas) helps us
understand the Merleau-Pontian methodology outlined in the next sections. But a plausible case
could be made that something like the dialectic sketched in this section plays out in the development
of Husserl’s early thought. It might be argued that the criticisms of the ‘psychologistic’ project of his
Foundations of Arithmetic (see Frege and Kluge 1972) parallel the problems for Humean phenomen-
ology sketched above, and motivate the transcendental methodology of his Logical Investigations which
develops into the Husserlian phenomenology of the Ideas.
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and self-evident. By appealing to an intuitive contact with the necessity and
self-evidence of the essential structures of perception, the Husserlian thus
attempts to simultaneously ground the authority of their claims in experience
and in reflection.
However, it appears that this attempted synthesis of Humean and Kantian
phenomenology inherits rather than transcends the problems with each position.
For any intuited essence we can ask the Husserlian why we should be impressed
either by the authority of its experiential character, or by the way it appears to
reflection. Why isn’t the fact that I experience a purported essential property as
apodictic or self-evident just another ‘datum on the tablet’ to be set alongside all
the other arbitrary empirical properties of my experience? If the Husserlian
answers via appeal to the rational credentials of the intuition—the way in which
the experienced self-evidence makes good reflective sense—then they can be asked
the same questions we used to embarrass the Kantian, above. Instead of being
stuck in the unsatisfactory positions of either the Humean or the Kantian, the
Husserlian is now see-sawing between them—a different predicament, but not
obviously a better one.
We are now in a position to see why the later works of Husserl, and the
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, come to see phenomenology as defined by
the need for ‘radical reflection’ that involves a critical awareness of its own
presuppositions. We can see each of the positions sketched above as attempting
to secure general philosophical conclusions about perception via a particular kind
of reflection. The Humean attempts to attend carefully to the surface features of
particular experiences. The Kantian attempts to provide theoretical reconstruc-
tions of the rationally necessary preconditions for uncontroversially manifest
features of general classes of experience. And the Husserlian occupies a halfway
house between the Humean and Kantian positions, attempting to intuit essential
properties of types of experience by grasping them directly and self-evidently. We
have just questioned the authority of each kind of reflection, asking why it should
count as a reliable source of insight into perception’s structural properties. In the
next section we will see how these questions motivate the later Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty to build a commitment to an ongoing assessment of the genesis
and authority of our reflective capacities into phenomenological methodology.
4. From Husserlian Phenomenology to Radical Reflection
Let’s revisit some of the antinomial characterizations of phenomenology with
which Merleau-Ponty begins his Phenomenology of Perception, alluded to at the
start of this chapter. Phenomenology is a ‘study of essences’, but one which ‘places
essences back within existence and thinks that the only way to understand
man and the world is by beginning from their “facticity” ’ (PhP lxx); and it
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is a ‘transcendental philosophy’ which nonetheless seeks to rediscover a ‘naïve
contact’ with a world which is ‘always “already there” prior to reflection’ (PhP lxx).
These are the tensions we have just articulated for Husserlian phenomenology, as
it see-saws between the unsatisfactory Humean attempt to ground its claims in
untheorized (intuitive) experience, and the unsatisfactory Kantian attempt to
support those claims via reflective reconstruction of transcendental conditions.
As we will see below (§5), there is a lot packed in to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that
phenomenology ‘places essences back within existence’ and emphasizes the ‘fac-
ticity’ of perceivers and world. But it in part alludes to the tension we have seen
between Humean and Kantian approaches—between the Humean impulse to
ground their claims in the empirical regularities that characterize particular
experiences and the Kantian impulse to ground their claims in the transcendental
necessity of the perceptual structures they describe. Likewise, we have just seen
that a potentially problematic gap opens up between the Kantian’s ‘transcendental
philosophy’ and the ‘naïve’ untheorized experience that exists ‘prior to reflec-
tion’—but also that the Humean’s sole emphasis on the surface properties of
experience appeared to thwart their aspiration to articulate general structural
features of perception. The Husserlian attempts to respond to these problems by
amalgamating the Humean and Kantian positions, appealing to a capacity to
‘intuit’ essential properties of perception that is supposed to be simultaneously
experiential (grounded in an experience of insight arrived at via eidetic variation)
and rational (the insight is experienced as reflectively apodictic). In this section
I further develop the problems that Merleau-Ponty, drawing on Husserl’s later
work, sees for the Husserlian position, and the way in which these problems
motivate a conception of phenomenology as involving ‘radical reflection’.
A good starting point is the final antinomyMerleau-Ponty lists. Phenomenology
is, he says:
the attempt to provide a direct description of our experience such as it is, and
without any consideration of its psychological genesis or of the causal explan-
ations that the scientist, historian, or sociologist might offer of that experience;
and yet in his final works Husserl mentions a ‘genetic phenomenology’ (PhP lxx)
Whereas the ‘static’ Husserlian phenomenology we have been considering aims
only to grasp the essential structures that our experience has, the ‘genetic
Phenomenology’ mooted in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations and developed in
his Crisis of European Sciences and other late writings aims to uncover the genesis
of those structures in our bodily, historical, and cultural situation. Because, in my
view, this kind of genetic phenomenology receives its fullest articulation in
Merleau-Ponty’s work, I’ll refer to it simply as Merleau-Pontian phenomenology
in what follows. This move from static to genetic phenomenology should be
understood, I suggest, as a response to the worries about the credentials of
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Humean, Kantian, and Husserlian modes of reflection on experience summarized
at the end of the last section. Genetic phenomenology aims to investigate the
origins of what seems reflectively evident or apodictic to us, and does so in a way
that problematizes the kinds of phenomenological reflection we’ve considered so
far. Considering the ways in which bodily, historical, and cultural factors condi-
tion our experience suggests that we can’t properly identify experience’s essential
structures via the armchair reflections of the Kantian or Husserlian. And consid-
ering the way those same factors condition our reflective capacities problematizes
the idea that those capacities are apt to put us in touch with the kinds of essences
that Kantians and Husserlians seek. This appears to send us back into the arms of
the Humean. But we have just seen that Humeans cannot motivate conclusions
about essential structures of experience that have the generality which phenom-
enologists seek. This all sounds like bad news for phenomenologists. Indeed, the
rest of this section draws on Merleau-Ponty to note the negative consequences
that the contingent bodily, linguistic, and cultural origins of our experiences and
reflections appear to have for Husserlian phenomenology. But don’t despair—
the negative consequences surveyed in this section allow us to see, in the next
section, the positive shape that a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of percep-
tion must take.
Merleau-Ponty has the most to say about the ways in which bodily and
psychological contingencies shape our reflective capacities and intuitions about
essential properties of experience. I’ll say more about this in the next section, since
Merleau-Ponty’s views here are particularly helpful for understanding his positive
suggestions about how Husserlian phenomenology should be superseded. But the
simple idea is familiar from some Humean worries considered earlier. Recall that
Hume argued that we lacked reason to think that the apparent ineliminability of
some ideas, such as causal connectedness, from certain perceptual experiences
reflected any more than a quirk of our psychology. If a Husserlian phenomenolo-
gist, engaged in eidetic variation, finds themselves unable to imaginatively subtract
causal structure from their experiences of unfolding events then this might reflect
only contingent features and limitations of their psychology, rather than any deep
insight into transcendentally necessary structures of experience. The contingen-
cies of our bodily (including neural and thus, I am supposing, psychological)
organization constrain what is reflectively and imaginatively possible for us. Can
you imagine, for example, having a perceptual experience without simultaneously
experiencing yourself as existing? Probably not—but this is just how some suf-
ferers of Cotard’s syndrome sincerely describe their experience (Debruyne et al.
2009). When you engage in phenomenological reflection on whether a sense of
one’s own existence as a perceiver is a necessary structure of perceptual experi-
ence, your best introspective, reflective, and imaginative attempts to answer this
question might be mere reflections of the happy neural contingency that you don’t
have Cotard’s syndrome.
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As well as worrying the Husserlian with the possibility that the results of their
eidetic variation reflect mere contingent psychological quirks, we can worry them
with the possibility that their intuitions of reflective apodicticity or self-evidence
are results of their contingent linguistic, cultural and historical situation. Merleau-
Ponty writes:
It is possible for me to believe that I am seeing an essence when, in fact, it is not
an essence at all but merely a concept rooted in language, a prejudice whose
apparent coherence reduces merely to the fact that I have become used to it
through habit. (Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man
(henceforth PSM), PrP 75)
Abstracting away from the nuances of Merleau-Ponty’s account of language, we
can read his argument here as drawing on two uncontroversial claims. First, the
phenomenologist’s capacity for sophisticated reflective thought depends on facil-
ity with language. Making reflective judgements based on the results of eidetic
variation is something that we can only do in virtue of the fact that we are
language users. Second, this facility with language is a contingent, culturally
mediated acquisition—the linguistic capacities on which the phenomenologist’s
reflective thought depends are available to them only because they are born and
enculturated into existing practices for using language. It follows from these two
claims that the Husserlian’s reflections on the essential structures of experience
can no longer be understood as uncovering a priori truths that are straightfor-
wardly independent of the empirical contingencies of their situation. We saw
above that if phenomenology consists in attempting to grasp the essential struc-
tures of experience, then it is susceptible to the question of how we can be certain
we’ve attained such a grasp. We also saw that attempting to answer this question
via simple appeal to the way in which such a grasp is experienced by the
phenomenologist courts Humean sceptical worries—why isn’t such an experience
just one more datum on our tablet of contingent psychological phenomena? Now
we have seen that the more sophisticated attempt to answer this question in terms
of the way in which an intuited essence presents itself to reflection as apodictically
certain also faces a challenge: if we agree that the Husserlian’s reflective capacities
depend on the contingent fact that they have been enculturated into a specific
system of linguistic practices, then their reflective judgements of apodicticity
appear to be tainted with this contingency. It thus becomes hard to see how
such judgements can be taken to reveal essential as opposed to contingent
structural properties of experience. More bluntly, the worry is that the
Husserlian’s putative grasp of an essence fails to show anything interesting
about the fundamental structure of perception; instead, it merely shows us
something about the way they happen to think, which is in turn a mere function
of a way they happen to talk.
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The linguistic mediation of thought is one way in which the Husserlian’s
cultural and historical situation threatens to infect their claims about experience’s
essential structures with contingency. Beyond this, we might worry that empirical
evidence of sociological and anthropological diversity suggests that what strikes us
as an apodictic or essential feature of experience is a mere cultural quirk—as
when, for example, intuitions about the way in which numerical quantity figures
in our experience are called into question by learning that some Australian or
Amazonian cultures have no fine-grained system for describing numerical quan-
tity (e.g. Frank et al. 2008). In this connection, Merleau-Ponty reports Husserl
changing his mind about the relevance of empirical anthropological data to
phenomenology upon reading Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s ethnological study Primitive
Mythology. ‘Before this,’ he writes, ‘Husserl had maintained that a mere imagina-
tive variation of the facts would enable us to conceive of every possible experience
we might have’ (PSM, PrP 90). But in a subsequent letter to Lévy-Bruhl Husserl
admits that:
the philosopher could not possibly have immediate access to the universal by
reflection alone—that he is in no position to do without anthropological experi-
ence or to construct what constitutes the meaning of other experiences and
civilizations by a purely imaginary variation of his own experiences. (S, 107)
The worry thus arises that the Husserlian’s contingent cultural inheritance places
arbitrary restrictions on their reflections in two ways—via constraining the
vocabulary within which those reflections can take place, and via local cultural
idiosyncrasies influencing reflection on what is or is not an essential structural
property of experience.
Finally, the particular point in intellectual history at which we are situated can
make a difference to the truths we take to be apodictically certain, as when the
formalization and empirical application of non-Euclidean geometries reveals that
‘The supposed evidentness of Euclidean geometry’ was ‘evident merely for a
certain historical period of the human spirit’ (PhP 414/454). Romdenh-
Romluc’s example (2018, this volume) of Carmita Wood illustrates how phenom-
enological reflection can be tied to cultural and historical contingencies. Wood, a
lab worker in Cornell’s department of nuclear physics during the 1960s, quit her
job after being subjected to a sustained campaign of sexual harassment by a senior
scientist. But it was only years after her resignation that Wood was able to make
full sense of the pattern of behaviour and experiences that drove her from her job.
The reflective understanding of that pattern as a manifestation of sexual harass-
ment was not readily available in Wood’s 1960s environment; her intuitive grasp
of that pattern only became possible retrospectively, once the concept of sexual
harassment had become common currency. Like Carmita Wood, a phenomenol-
ogist’s best attempts at grasping the essential structures of their experience will go
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only as far as the reflective apparatus afforded by their historical and cultural
situation can take them.
So far, then, we have seen that the problems for Humean, Kantian, and
Husserlian phenomenology point towards the need for a ‘radical reflection’—a
way of doing phenomenology that critically examines the origins of its own
reflective capacities and convictions. But the suggestions about these origins
canvassed here look like bad news: the ‘human sciences’—including psychology,
linguistics, sociology, and history—reveal multiple ways in which the phenomen-
ologist’s grasp of putatively essential structures of experience is inescapably
influenced by contingent features of their situation.
5. Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology of Perception
The sources of contingency surveyed in the last section simultaneously motivate
scepticism about the essences that the phenomenologist tries to grasp, and the
reflective capacities used to grasp them. Both now appear to be reflections of
various contingencies of our factual situation. The Merleau-Pontian phenomen-
ologist, however, views these contingencies not as problems but as opportunities.
Merleau-Ponty argues that we should reconceive our understanding of both
essences and reflection in ways that acknowledge and embrace these contingen-
cies, putting them to work in accounts of how particular experiential structures
come to count for us as essential to our subjectivity—that is, in accounts of the
genesis of essences and their reflective credentials. For reasons of space, I’ll limit
myself to one example of this strategy—the way in which Merleau-Ponty’s use of a
specific empirical case study figures in an argument that an implicit sense of the
possibilities for active engagement with our environment is an essential property
of world-disclosing perception. This illustration, however, does not fully capture
the way in which Merleau-Pontian phenomenology involves a reconception of
reflection itself as well as the essences at which reflection aims. The remainder of
this section briefly brings the general shape of this ‘radical reflection’ into
clearer view.
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology remains committed to the search for
essences, but—as we will now see—its vision of what those essences are, and
how to find them, changes. One source of this change is the recognition of a close
relationship between the essential structures and the factual contingences of the
ways in which they are realized by our body and its relation to the world. Merleau-
Ponty argues that the Husserlian’s transcendental methodology already entails
this relationship:
If in Husserl’s view the knowledge of facts is impossible without some insight
into essence and is always helped by this, it follows that all sound knowledge of
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facts must include, at least implicitly, some insight into essences, and that Husserl
must admit, as he does in effect, that those psychologists who have been
preoccupied with facts have nevertheless been able to find out something con-
cerning essences. (PSM, PrP 66)
We saw above (§2) that Husserl makes the transcendental claim that our access to
empirical facts is necessarily mediated by the essential structures that phenomen-
ologists aim to grasp and catalogue. Merleau-Ponty’s claim above is that this
commits us to thinking that, insofar as we agree that psychologists are successfully
uncovering empirical facts about our minds, these facts can function as a source of
insight into the essences to which they are necessarily related. This is why
Merleau-Ponty took such a keen interest in a wide range of scientific disciplines,
including Gestalt psychology, Saussurian linguistics, and Freudian psychiatry.
Whilst he disagreed in important ways with the commitments of these
approaches, he nonetheless argued that each domain yields new insights into
the structures of experience that must be integrated into an adequate phenomen-
ology. Empirical psychology thus becomes a key catalyst for eidetic variation—
each of the above domains prompts us to consider, and find truth in, new ways of
understanding ourselves.
Consider, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the brain-damaged
World War I veteran, ‘Schneider’ (PhP Pt. I ch.3). As a result of his injuries,
Schneider exhibited an unusual patchwork of sensorimotor and cognitive impair-
ments, including an inability to visually recognize objects coupled with intact
visuomotor abilities to perform habitual and automatic actions, such as negotiat-
ing his environment, opening doors, and even making leather wallets. The most
important feature of Schneider’s syndrome of impaired and intact capacities, for
Merleau-Ponty, is the contrast between Schneider’s intact sensorimotor habits and
his impaired capacity to put those habits to use in flexible, open-ended interaction
with his environment—what Merleau-Ponty calls a power to ‘reckon with the
possible’ (PhP 112/139; Romdenh-Romluc 2007). Schneider can interact with his
perceptible environment in rigid, task-specific ways, but lacks, on Merleau-
Ponty’s diagnosis, a sense of the way in which his relation to that environment
affords the satisfaction or frustration of an open-ended range of actual and
potential projects. The sensorimotor actions Schneider can successfully perform
are habituated and task-specific ones that are automatically drawn from him by
his environment. The actions which he cannot, or struggles to, perform—such as
pointing, pantomiming, or playful and creative ways of engaging with his
surroundings—are those not directly linked to a current, habituated task. The
case of Schneider is one of many in PhP that is intended to reveal the way in which
our awareness of our surroundings is pervasively structured by an implicit sense of
the way in which they afford the satisfaction or frustration of both our current and
our potential projects. We might judge, from our armchairs, that our perceptual
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experience of objects could survive the subtraction of a background sense of the
open-ended range of possible ways we might engage with them. But the empirical
facts about the way in which this sense is impaired for Schneider help us
intuitively grasp the role that it plays in structuring our own experience—a role
that we might otherwise have missed. At the same time, these facts reveal a sense
in which this essential structure of our experience has its basis in empirical
contingencies—the happy contingency that we lack the brain lesions that are
responsible for Schneider’s symptoms.
Importantly, Merleau-Ponty’s use of Schneider’s case is just one strand of a
central argument of PhP which aims to demonstrate that in perception, ‘a system
of possible movements, or “motor projects” radiates from us to our environment’,
and that all perceptual experiences are conditioned by this ‘global, practical, and
implicit notion of the relation between our body and things’ (PrP 5). Abstracting
away from its details, we can call this the ‘bodily-structure claim’ (BSC):
BSC: Perceptual experience necessarily involves an implicit awareness of the
perceiver’s embodied practical relationship to the perceived.
Why should we think that BSC constitutes the kind of claim about the kind of
essential structure of experience that phenomenologists seek, rather than one of
the contingent psychological quirks catalogued by Humeans? Considering the
empirical facts of Schneider’s case, or of our own experiences, cannot answer this
question. Instead, a sustained transcendental argument is woven through the rest
of PhP that BSC is a condition of the very possibility of perceiver/world relations,
since our experience of the reality of the objects of perception must be understood
in terms of their positive and negative relations to our actual and potential
exploratory activities and projects.
In brief outline, the argument aims to show that perceiving something as
‘real’—as enjoying a perceiver-independent existence—requires being aware of it
‘as the infinite sum of an indefinite series of perspectival views in each of which the
object is given, but in none of which is it given exhaustively’ (PrP 15). As finite,
embodied perceivers, any vantage point on an object reveals particular aspects
while obscuring others—as when we see the facing side of a cube better than its
partially visible or hidden sides. Merleau-Ponty argues, however, that this partial
access does not impede our perception of the cube’s objective properties, but
makes it possible: ‘It is not accidental for the object to be given to me in a
“deformed” way, from the point of view which I occupy. That is the price of its
being “real” ’ (PrP 15–16). Unlike your inner speech or sensory imaginings, your
experience of external objects is given to you as provisional and incomplete, in a
way that permits and invites further bodily exploration: ‘When I see an object,
I always feel that there is still some being beyond what I currently see . . . a depth of
the object that no sensory withdrawal will ever exhaust’ (PhP 224/261). This
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experienced provisionality is part of what it is to experience those objects as
having an objective, rather than purely subjective, existence. And we experience
this provisionality in the form of an implicit awareness of the ways in which
changes in our bodily relationship to the object will bring other aspects into view.
In the interests of space, I am suppressing many of the details of this argument
as it figures in PhP.⁴ Most important for our purposes is its general structure,
which closely parallels the Kantian strategy we encountered above. Faced with the
challenge of demonstrating that BSC reflects an essential structure of perceptual
experience, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is a prerequisite for an uncontroversially
manifest property of perceptual experience—its seeming to present us with real,
perceiver-independent things. The aim is to show that BSC inherits its essentiality
from the world-disclosing character of perception, an essential structural feature
of perceptual experience that is not in dispute. However, this is not the armchair
transcendentalism of the Kantian. Like the Husserlian, Merleau-Ponty attempts to
bring this structure into view for us via eidetic variation, inviting us to test his
claims against specific experiences of our own. Unlike the Husserlian, Merleau-
Ponty’s eidetic variation also makes use of empirical cases involving experiences
his readers are unlikely to have had (such as Schneider’s) as catalysts. The reported
experiences of those for whom implicit understanding of the systematic and open-
ended range of possibilities for bodily exploration of the perceived has gone
missing (as in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Schneider) or has yet to be learned
(as in his discussion of the experiences of post-operative congenital cataract
patients) (PhP 231–2) provide contrast cases that illuminate the way in which
this bodily understanding structures our own perception. Once we have homed in
on BSC in this way, Merleau-Ponty (like the Husserlian and Kantian) argues that
it qualifies as an essential structure of experience in virtue of its status as a
necessary prerequisite for an uncontroversial manifest feature of experience—its
world-disclosing status.
The above argument thus involves a reciprocal interplay between empirical and
transcendental considerations in the service of identifying an essential structure of
experience. In doing so, it sets Merleau-Pontian phenomenology apart from the
other positions canvassed above. For our purposes here, the most important
consequence of this form of argument is a blurring of the boundaries between
empirical facts and transcendental structures. Kantian and Husserlians are com-
mitted to a sharp distinction between the essential structure we have identified (as
expressed in BSC) and the contingent facts in virtue of which experience possesses
that structure. The contingent facts in this case would include the particular
details of our embodiment, and the ways in which Schneider’s sensorimotor
capacities were impaired. Merleau-Ponty’s claim, here and elsewhere, is that fact
⁴ See in particular PhP 242/280; 331–41/373–84.
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and essence cannot be pulled apart—the reflective purchase we have on BSC exists
only in virtue of the contingent facts of our embodiment that give our experience
the structure BSC describes. An articulation of an essence like BSC ties together
and reveals the significance of particular contingencies of the facts of our
embodied perceptual lives—but that significance is only available to the phenom-
enologist’s reflection in virtue of their living such a life. As Merleau-Ponty puts it
in PhP’s preface, ‘essences must bring with them all of the living relations of
experience, like the net that draws up both quivering fish and seaweed from the
seabed’ (lxxix, 15–16).
I started this section by saying that Merleau-Pontian views the contingencies
we noted for the Husserlian (§4) as opportunities rather than problems—we
have now seen one way in which this is so. The contingent facts of our
embodied relation to the world are put to work in an account of how the
phenomenologist can grasp a particular structural property as essential to their
subjectivity, since those facts constitute the phenomenologist’s mode of reflect-
ive access to that property. This is the sense in which Merleau-Pontian phe-
nomenology involves ‘radical reflection’—it focuses not just on identifying
essences that are experienced as reflectively apodictic, but on accounting for
the origins of that reflective status via connecting it to the contingent facts of
our lives and situation. The example I have just sketched drew only on the facts
of our bodily situation—but we saw above that the phenomenologist’s reflec-
tions are also shaped by linguistic, sociological, and historical facts. Whilst
bodily contingencies of the kinds we’ve just alluded to shape the perceptual
experience on which the phenomenologist reflects, linguistic, social, and his-
torical contingencies chiefly shape the reflective capacities that the phenomen-
ologist trains on their experiences. Thus, a Merleau-Pontian ‘radical reflecter’ is
committed to understanding their own reflective capacities and activities by, in
part, studying and understanding these contingencies and their role in our
reflective lives.
Merleau-Ponty’s sustained engagement with linguistic theory, history, politics,
sociology, and anthropology speaks to this ambition. The task of extracting a
stable theory of reflection from this huge body of work is a daunting one. Instead
of attempting it here, I will end by considering some remarks that suggest the
shape which Merleau-Ponty thought such a theory should take. A good place to
start is with a line of thought in PhP on the dependence of the ideals of truth and
objectivity at which reflection aims on an intersubjectively shared set of linguistic
capacities. Speech, argues Merleau-Ponty, involves ‘a power of thinking according
to others, which enriches our own thoughts’ (PhP 184/218–19, original emphasis;
compare CES 360–1), and does so by leading ‘to a thought which is no longer ours
alone, to a thought which is presumptively universal’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962/1964,
8). Our acquisition of unthinking facility with speech and the intersubjectively
accessible and situation-independent meanings at which it aims gives rise to the
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ideal of a locus of meaning and truth that is independent of particular contingent
acts of expression:
Language has, in fact, installed in us this certainty that we have of reaching,
beyond its expression, a truth separable from that expression, and of which this
expression is only the clothing and the contingent manifestation.
(PhP 422/460, see also 196/231)
Just as Merleau-Ponty argues that the world-disclosing nature of our experience is
founded on, rather than undermined by, our inevitably incomplete bodily relation
to the world, he wishes to argue that our ideal of truth is founded on, rather than
undermined by, the complex web of intersubjective conventions and relations that
composes the cultural institution of language. This line of thought persists
throughout Merleau-Ponty’s career. In a late essay, he writes:
Since we are all hemmed in by history, it is up to us to understand that whatever
truth we may have is to be gotten not in spite of but through our historical
inheritance. Superficially considered, our inherence destroys all truth; considered
radically, it founds a new idea of truth . . . [I]f I have once realized that through it
[my inherence in a historical situation] I am grafted onto every action and all
knowledge which can have a meaning for me, and that step by step it contains
everything which can exist for me, then my contact with the social in the finitude
of my situation is revealed to me as the point of origin of all truth. (S, 109)
An aim of phenomenology as radical reflection, then, is to understand the ways in
which the very ideal of truth—the ideal which guides our assessment of the
veracity of the phenomenologist’s descriptions and reflective reconstructions—is
not undermined by, but is dependent on, the facts of our social, cultural, and
historical situation. Much of Merleau-Ponty’s work after the completion of PhP,
variously focusing on linguistics, sociology, anthropology, and history, affords
suggestive hints about how he might have wished to fill in the details of this
picture. But they remain only hints, as Merleau-Ponty’s work was cut short by his
early death.
If we don’t know the exact shape that a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of
radical reflection would take, however, we do know its general structure. As well as
identifying the essential structures of perceptual experience, it must simultan-
eously identify the essential structures of the reflective capacities involved in its
own execution. And it must do both of these things in a way that shows how these
essential structures emerge from the contingencies of our worldly situation, in a
way that must be informed by a richly interdisciplinary engagement with multiple
empirical and human sciences. If the Merleau-Pontian argument above is right,
then phenomenological philosophy of perception must take this shape—the
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failures of Humean and Kantian approaches that appeal only to the concrete
matter or the abstract structure of experience, and of Husserlian approaches that
appeal to an undertheorized capacity to intuit apodictically necessary essential
structures, lead us inexorably to a conception of phenomenology as radical
reflection. Even if Merleau-Ponty has, understandably, left us short of the destin-
ation of a truly radically reflective phenomenology, he has provided us with a good
head start, a detailed map, and plenty to do on the journey.⁵
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